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Deception detection research has shown that when people 
judge whether someone is lying or telling the truth, they are 
biased toward believing the sender is truthful (Levine, Park, & 
McCornack, 1999). However, among police offi cers and other 
practitioners, this tendency is weaker or even reversed—that is, 
often professionals have been found to believe the sender is lying 
more often than telling the truth (Masip, 2014; Meissner & Kassin, 
2002; Vrij, 2008). 
Detecting deception is intrinsically diffi cult (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). Research shows that behavioral deception cues are faint 
and unreliable; thus, often the senders’ statements contain little 
or no information indicative of veracity (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & 
Sporer, 2015; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007). According to 
the Adaptive Lie Detector Theory (ALIED; Street, 2015; Street, 
Bischof, Vadillo, & Kingstone, 2016), when a specifi c statement 
contains insuffi cient information to assess veracity, people make 
an informed guess based on context-general information. The 
base rate of truthful or deceptive statements one encounters is a 
kind of context-general information. Because most statements that 
ordinary people encounter regularly are truthful, when ordinary 
citizens are uncertain about the veracity of a statement the odds 
are that they make truth judgments, thus displaying the truth bias. 
However, because police offi cers encounter deceptive messages 
more often than ordinary citizens, they will be less likely to assume 
truthfulness when uncertain about the veracity of a statement.
However, police experience and the kind of situation have 
an infl uence on the police response bias (note that this is also 
consistent with ALIED, as both past experience and situation 
can be forms of context-general information). Masip, Alonso, 
Herrero, and Garrido (2016) asked non-offi cers, novice offi cers, 
and experienced offi cers to judge the veracity of a number of 
truthful and deceptive videotaped statements about a theft. 
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Abstract Resumen
Background: Deception detection research has shown that, in judging 
veracity, police offi cers are less truth biased than non-offi cers. However, 
previous researchers have normally used videotaped statements where an 
unknown (but presumably large) number of stereotypical or real deception 
cues are displayed by the senders. We examined non-offi cers, novice 
offi cers, and experienced offi cers’ response tendencies in a more controlled 
situation where cue availability was severely restricted. Method: We used 
written vignettes describing either police-related or police-unrelated 
scenarios where the protagonist denied having committed a misdeed. Each 
vignette contained only two pieces of relevant information, one suggesting 
that the protagonist was lying and one suggesting that she or he was telling 
the truth. Results: Offi cers made fewer truth judgments than non-offi cers 
in judging police-relevant vignettes, but not in judging police-irrelevant 
vignettes. Both novice and experienced offi cers had greater judgmental 
confi dence than non-offi cers. Conclusions: The fi ndings are consistent 
with the Adaptive Lie Detection Theory (ALIED). Future research should 
continue to explore how the police relevance of the situation or task at 
hand infl uences novice and experienced offi cers’ veracity judgments.
Keywords: Deception detection, truth bias, lie bias, police, ALIED, 
adaptive lie detector.
Examen del sesgo de respuesta de los policías al juzgar la veracidad. 
Antecedentes: la investigación muestra que al juzgar la veracidad los 
policías presentan un menor sesgo de veracidad que los no-policías. 
Normalmente, los investigadores han venido usando declaraciones en 
vídeo con emisores que muestran diversas claves estereotípicas o reales 
de la mentira. En este estudio examinamos las tendencias de respuesta 
de no-policías, policías nuevos y policías con experiencia cuando la 
disponibilidad de claves está limitada. Método: empleamos breves 
descripciones de situaciones policialmente relevantes o irrelevantes en 
las que el protagonista negaba haber cometido una mala acción. Cada 
texto contenía solo dos unidades relevantes de información: una que 
sugería que el protagonista mentía y otra que sugería que decía la verdad. 
Resultados: los policías hicieron menos juicios de verdad que los no-
policías al juzgar situaciones policialmente relevantes, pero no al juzgar 
situaciones policialmente irrelevantes. Además, tanto los policías nuevos 
como los experimentados mostraron más confi anza en sus juicios que los 
no-policías. Conclusión: los hallazgos son consistentes con la Teoría de 
la Detección de Mentiras Adaptativa. La investigación futura debe seguir 
explorando la infl uencia de la relevancia policial de la situación o tarea 
sobre los juicios de veracidad de policías nuevos y veteranos.
Palabras clave: detección de mentiras, sesgo de veracidad, sesgo de 
mendacidad, policía, ALIED.
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Relative to non-offi cers, experienced offi cers made signifi cantly 
more lie judgments and displayed signifi cantly more judgmental 
confi dence. Interestingly, novice offi cers aligned with experienced 
offi cers in terms of judgments, but with the non-offi cers in terms of 
confi dence. Further, novice offi cers scored lower than experienced 
offi cers on a scale measuring generalized communicative suspicion 
(GCS; Levine & McCornack, 1991), but as high as experienced 
offi cers on a parallel scale measuring suspicion in police-related 
situations (Interrogation Suspicion Scale or ISS). These fi ndings 
suggest that novice offi cers are not yet as dispositionally suspicious 
and self-confi dent (GCS scores and confi dence) as experienced 
offi cers (who, apparently, become more distrustful over their 
career), but are able to show “prototypical” police behaviors (as 
refl ected in their numerous lie judgments and high ISS scores) in 
police-related situations.
Normally, deception researchers have used videotaped 
statements where an indeterminate number of real or stereotypical 
deception cues are displayed. Participants may pick up some cues 
to form their veracity judgments. Under these conditions, it is 
unclear the extent to which cue availability mediates the veracity 
judgments. For instance, relative to non-offi cers, police offi cers 
might use more cues, be more attentive to deception (rather than 
truthfulness) cues, or interpret ambiguous behavior as lie indicators 
(see Masip, Garrido, Herrero, Antón, & Alonso, 2006; Nahari, 
2012). The current study explored whether police offi cers’ greater 
tendency (relative to non-offi cers) to make lie judgments was still 
found in an almost “cueless situation”—that is, a situation where 
cue availability was severely restricted.
To study offi cers’ judgments in such a controlled and “aseptic” 
situation, we wrote a number of vignettes where the protagonist 
denied having committed a misdeed. Each vignette contained only 
two pieces of information relative to the protagonist’s veracity: One 
suggesting that s/he was lying and one suggesting that s/he was 
telling the truth. Thus, the vignettes were ambiguous as to whether 
the person was honest or deceptive. A pilot study with non-offi cers 
showed that the vignettes we used were judged to be deceptive as 
often as truthful (about 50% of the time). Ten vignettes were used in 
the main experiment—fi ve describing police-relevant scenarios and 
fi ve describing police-irrelevant scenarios. We examined whether 
under these contrived conditions police offi cers’ judgments were 
infl uenced by the one piece of information suggestive of deception 
more often than non-offi cers’ judgments.
In view of Masip et al.’s (2016) fi ndings, we predicted that in 
judging police-relevant vignettes, both novice and experienced 
offi cers would make more lie judgments than non-offi cers 
(Hypothesis 1). We also predicted that in judging police-irrelevant 
vignettes, experienced offi cers would make more lie judgments 
than both novice offi cers and non-offi cers (Hypothesis 2), while 
the latter two groups would not differ from each other. Finally, we 
predicted that experienced offi cers would show higher judgmental 




Non-offi cers (undergraduates), novice offi cers, and experienced 
offi cers participated in this experiment. Sample sizes and descriptive 
information are provided in Table 1. The veteran offi cers’ mean 
job experience was 21.79 years, SD = 4.33, Mdn = 21, range: 14-
35. Fifty fi ve novice offi cers (51%) had less than one year of job 
experience, 16 (15%) had three years, seven (7%) had two years, 
and none had more than nine years of experience. 
Instruments
To create the stimulus materials, we wrote 16 one-paragraph 
long vignettes containing a short story where the protagonist 
denied having committed a misdeed. Two pieces of evidence 
were described in each vignette: One strongly suggesting that the 
protagonist was lying and one strongly suggesting that s/he was 
honest. Eight vignettes were intended to describe police-relevant 
scenarios (e.g., a crime) whereas the remaining eight were intended 
to describe police-irrelevant scenarios (e.g., an infi delity episode). 
The vignettes are available on request. 
A pilot study was conducted where participants (college 
students) judged (a) whether the protagonist in each vignette was 
lying or telling the truth, and (b) the extent to which each vignette 
was police-relevant. The purpose of the pilot study was to select 
a subset of vignettes meeting two essential requirements: First, to 
be used in the main experiment, the vignettes had to be ambiguous 
in terms of the protagonist’s veracity (i.e., the evidence suggesting 
truthfulness had to be about the same as strong as the evidence 
suggesting deception). We selected for the main experiment only 
those vignettes that, in the pilot study, were judged to be deceptive 
as often as truthful (about 50% of the time). Second, half the 
vignettes in the main experiment had to describe police-relevant 
scenarios, whereas the other half had to describe police-irrelevant 
scenarios.
Pilot study participants and procedure
We collected data from 30 undergraduates during a lecture. 
Because seven participants were foreign students whose fi rst 
language was not Spanish, the fi nal sample contained 23 students 
(19 females and four males; M
age
 = 23; Mdn = 22; range: 20 to 30). 
Sample size is suffi cient, as n ≥ 20 (per cell) has been proposed to 
avoid Type I errors (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The 
data analyses were also conducted with all 30 students; the values 
varied only slightly and the pattern of results was identical.
Participants were given a booklet with 17 pages. The fi rst page 
was to collect demographic data (age, gender, nationality, and 
language). It also contained the instructions. Each of the remaining 
pages contained one vignette, followed by the question whether 
the protagonist was lying or telling the truth (counter-balanced), 
and a 5-point scale to indicate judgmental confi dence (1 = not at all 
confi dent; 5 = completely confi dent). The instructions informed the 
participants that they would read 16 brief stories where a person 
Table 1
Descriptive information of the participants
N nmales nfemales Mage SDage Mdnage
Age 
range
Non-offi cers 77 13 64 21.92 1.48 22 20-27
Novice offi cers 108 67 40 29.80 3.25 29 24-39
Experienced 
offi cers
102 89 12 44.64 4.62 44 36-56
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denied her/his involvement in some actions, and instructed the 
participants to indicate for each vignette whether the person was 
lying or telling the truth and their confi dence. 
After completing this task, the participants were given an 
additional form to indicate the extent to which each vignette had 
police relevance on a 1 (no police relevance at all) to 5 (maximum 
police relevance) scale. The participants were fi rst informed that 
“a vignette has police relevance if it describes a crime, if police 
intervention is needed, if it may be a source of concern for the 
authorities, etc.” After the participants had fi nished all tasks, the 
experimenter collected the materials, thanked the participants and 
debriefed them. 
Pilot study results: Stimuli selection
We ran chi-square tests comparing the percentage of participants 
selecting the “lying” vs. the “telling the truth” option for each 
vignette. The difference was not signifi cant for 11 out of the 16 
vignettes (Table 2). 
Student’s t tests revealed that the mean score on the police-
relevance scale was signifi cantly different from 3 (value on 
the middle of the scale) for all vignettes (Table 2). This fi nding 
indicates that all vignettes were either unambiguously police-
irrelevant (nine vignettes) or unambiguously police-relevant 
(seven vignettes). Out of the 11 vignettes for which the participants 
had made a similar number of truth and lie judgments, fi ve were 
judged to be police-relevant and six police-irrelevant. We excluded 
one irrelevant vignette to have fi ve vignettes of each kind for the 
main experiment (Table 2). 
For the selected police-relevant vignettes, the mean percentage 
of lie judgments was 47.83%, SD = 23.92, which did not differ 
signifi cantly from 50%, t (22) = -0.44, p = .667, d = 0.09. For 
the selected police-irrelevant vignettes, the percentage of lie 
judgments was 45.22%, SD = 23.52, which did not differ from 
50% either, t (22) = -0.98, p = .340, d = 0.20. The selected police-
relevant vignettes had been rated by participants as signifi cantly 
more police-relevant (M = 4.68, SD = 0.32) than the selected 
police-irrelevant vignettes (M = 1.28, SD = 0.22), t (22) = 39.25, 
p < .001, d = 12.33. Both kinds of vignettes differed signifi cantly 
from the midpoint (3) on the 1-to-5 police-relevance scale, t (22) 
= 24.90, p < .001, d = 5.19, and t (22) = -37.44, p < .001, d = 7.80, 
respectively.
Procedure
The data for the main experiment were collected in class during 
regular teaching hours either at the university (undergraduates) 
or at the police school (offi cers). Participants fi lled in a booklet 
that was identical to the one used in the pilot study, except that 
it contained only the ten selected vignettes in random order. The 
task and procedures were the same as in the pilot study except that 
police relevance was not assessed. 
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicted that in judging police-relevant vignettes, 
police offi cers would make more lie judgments than non-offi cers. 
A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the percentage of 
lie judgments (PLJ) in judging police-relevant vignettes yielded 
a signifi cant effect, F (2, 284) = 3.45, p = .033. Least signifi cant 
difference (LSD) tests indicated that relative to non-offi cers (M 
= 31.95, SD = 20.84), both novice (M = 40.37, SD = 21.53) and 
experienced offi cers (M = 36.08, SD = 22.35) made more deception 
judgments, but the difference was signifi cant for novice offi cers 
only (p = .010, d = 0.40, and p = .207, d = 0.19, respectively; 
see Table 3). Novice and experienced offi cers did not differ 
Table 2
Perceived veracity and police relevance for each vignette in the pilot study
Vignettes
Perceived veracity assessment Police relevance assessment
Telling the 
Truth
Lying Chi2 p M SD t (22) p Police relevance
1. Job Interview 95.65 4.35 19.17 <.001 1.48 0.79 -9.23 <.001 No
2. Class Assignment 91.30 8.70 15.70 <.001 1.04 0.21 -45.00 <.001 No
3. Heritage* 47.83 52.12 0.04 .835 4.74 0.69 12.11 <.001 Yes
4. Lottery 39.13 60.87 1.09 .297 2.26 1.01 -3.51 .002 No
5. Party Night* 69.57 30.43 3.52 .061 1.13 0.34 -26.04 <.001 No
6. The Literature Professor* 34.78 65.22 2.13 .144 1.00 0.00 -- a -- a No
7. The Hunting 86.96 13.04 12.57 <.001 4.61 0.72 10.68 <.001 Yes
8. The Arson* 47.83 52.17 0.04 .835 4.87 0.34 26.04 <.001 Yes
9. Mr. Castilla’s Murder* 60.87 39.13 1.09 .297 4.91 0.29 31.84 <.001 Yes
10. The Promotion* 69.57 30.43 3.52 .061 2.00 0.85 -5.62 <.001 No
11. Cyclist Run Over* 47.83 52.17 0.04 .835 4.74 0.54 15.42 <.001 Yes
12. The Apartment* 52.17 47.83 0.04 .835 1.23 0.87 -10.01 <.001 No
13. Lovers 86.96 13.04 12.57 <.001 1.41 0.73 -10.64 <.001 No
14. Cancelled Vacation* 47.83 52.17 0.04 .835 1.00 0.00 --a --a No
15. Hotel Night 78.26 21.74 7.35 .007 4.61 0.58 13.23 <.001 Yes
16. At Customs* 56.52 43.48 0.39 .532 4.13 0.76 7.16 <.001 Yes
* Vignettes retained for the main study.
a Student’s t tests could not be calculated because SD = 0.00: For these two vignettes, all participants provided exactly the same score. The score was 1 on a 1-to-5 scale, which indicates that all 
participants perceived these two vignettes to have no police relevance at all. 
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signifi cantly. A t test revealed a signifi cant difference between the 
PLJ of both police groups combined (M = 38.29, SD = 21.98) and 
that of non-offi cers (M = 31.95, SD = 20.84), t (285) = -2.19, p 
= .029, d = 0.29. This supported Hypothesis 1. Noteworthy, no 
group displayed a lie bias in absolute terms—i.e., all scores were 
below 50%. Recall that in the pilot study non-offi cers made a 
similar number of truth and lie judgments in rating these vignettes; 
unexpectedly, in the current experiment non-offi cers displayed a 
truth bias.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that in judging police-irrelevant 
vignettes, experienced offi cers would make more lie judgments 
than novice offi cers and non-offi cers. We ran a one-way ANOVA 
on the PLJ in judging police-irrelevant vignettes. The groups did 
not differ signifi cantly, F (2, 284) = 0.35, p = .707 (see Table 3 for 
means and standard deviations). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that experienced offi cers would show 
higher judgmental confi dence than both novice offi cers and non-
offi cers irrespective of vignette type. A Sample (non-offi cers/
novice offi cers/experienced offi cers) × Vignette Type (police-
relevant/police-irrelevant) ANOVA on confi dence scores yielded a 
signifi cant main effect for sample, F (2, 284) = 3.30, p = .037, η
p
2 
= .023. LSD post-hoc tests revealed that, as predicted, experienced 
offi cers (M = 3.33, SD =0.57) had signifi cantly more judgmental 
confi dence than non-offi cers (M = 3.12, SD = 0.56), p = .014, d = 
0.37. However, contrary to our prediction, novice offi cers (M = 
3.29, SD = 0.55) also displayed more confi dence than non-offi cers, 
p = .042, d = 0.31, and the difference between experienced and 
novice offi cers was not signifi cant, p = .625, d = 0.07 (Table 3). The 
Sample x Vignette Type interaction was not signifi cant either, F (2, 
284) = 1.99, p = .139, η
p
2 = .014. These outcomes indicate that both 
police groups were more confi dent than the students irrespective 
of vignette type. Indeed, a 2 (non-offi cers/offi cers) × 2 (police-
relevant/police-irrelevant vignettes) ANOVA on confi dence scores 
revealed that the average confi dence of the two police groups 
combined (M = 3.31, SD = 0.56) was signifi cantly higher than the 
non-offi cers’ confi dence (M = 3.12, SD = 0.56), F (1, 285) = 6.44, 
p = .012, d = 0.34. The interaction was not signifi cant, F (1, 285) 
= 0.91, p = .341, η
p
2 = .003. (The vignette type main effect was 
signifi cant in both ANOVAS, F (1, 284) = 42.84, p < .001, and F 
(1, 285) = 38.38, p < .001, respectively, indicating that confi dence 
was higher in judging police-irrelevant (M = 3.36, SD = 0.63) than 
police-relevant (M = 3.17, SD = 0.61) vignettes, d = 0.31).
Discussion
Previous research has shown that police offi cers are less biased 
than non-offi cers toward making truth judgments. There is some 
evidence that this difference may be a result of offi cers and non-
offi cers focusing on different cues when judging veracity (Masip et 
al., 2006; Nahari, 2012), and it has been suggested that offi cers have 
a default prior assumption that the sender is going to lie and, as they 
observe the sender’s behavior, they use a confi rmatory strategy, 
thus searching for deception cues, dismissing truthfulness cues, and 
interpreting ambiguous behavior as indicative of deception (Masip 
et al., 2006). However, in previous research an indeterminate (but 
presumably large) number of stereotypical truth and deception 
cues has been available to receivers. To dissect offi cers’ response 
bias in a more controlled situation, participants in the current study 
were asked to judge veracity with only two cues available to them: 
one indicative of honesty and one indicative of deception. Based 
on Masip et al.’s (2016) prior fi ndings, we predicted that in judging 
police-relevant vignettes, both novice and experienced offi cers 
would make more lie judgments than non-offi cers. This hypothesis 
was supported. We also predicted that in judging police-irrelevant 
vignettes, experienced offi cers would make more lie judgments 
than both novice offi cers and non-offi cers. This hypothesis was 
not supported. In fact, all three groups made a similar number of 
lie judgments. 
This latter fi nding is at odds with Masip et al.’s (2016) results. 
Masip et al. reported that when the task at hand was related to 
police work (e.g., judging the veracity of statements about a theft), 
novice offi cers were as distrustful and lie biased as experienced 
offi cers; however, when police relevance was absent, novice 
offi cers were less distrustful than seasoned offi cers—and as little 
distrustful as non-offi cers. Therefore, in the current experiment, 
in judging police-irrelevant vignettes, both novice offi cers and 
non-offi cers should have made fewer deception judgments than 
experienced offi cers. 
It is unclear why this did not occur. However, the current study 
differs from Masip et al.’s (2016) in a number of important aspects. 
The artifi ciality of the task (using written vignettes created ad 
hoc, presenting only two contradictory pieces of evidence, etc.) 
might have infl uenced the outcomes. More research is needed to 
explore the variables that moderate the differential effect that the 
professional relevance of the context or task at hand might have 
on experienced vs. novice offi cers’ lie judgments. In any case, 
it is interesting that in the current study offi cers made more lie 
judgments than non-offi cers in judging police-relevant vignettes, 
but not in judging police irrelevant vignettes; that is, police offi cers 
were less truth biased than non-offi cers in police-relevant contexts 
only.
This fi nding is consistent with ALIED (Street, 2015). According 
to ALIED, offi cers should not be less truth biased than non-offi cers 
in all kinds of contexts, but only in those where they are likely 
to be deceived—that is, in police-related contexts. To clarify, 
non-offi cers are unfamiliar with police situations—and, hence, 
with the experience of dealing with deception on a regular basis. 
Conversely, police offi cers do encounter many deceptive messages 
at work (i.e., in police-related situations). Therefore, when a police 
offi cer is in a police-related situation where s/he is uncertain about 
the veracity of a statement, it is functional for him/her to make a 
lie judgment. This may explain why police offi cers made more lie 
judgments than non-offi cers in judging police-relevant vignettes 
only.
One could argue that this explanation may hold for 
experienced offi cers only, but not for novice offi cers, who are less 
dispositionally distrustful than their more seasoned peers (Masip 
Table 3







Lie Judgments–Police Relevanta 31.95  (20.84) 40.37 (21.53) 36.08 (22.35)
Lie Judgments–Police Irrelevanta 45.97 (20.54) 47.78 (21.50) 45.29 (24.20)
Confi denceb 3.12 (0.56) 3.29 (0.55) 3.33 (0.57)
a Percentages. b Scores on a 1-to-5 scale
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et al., 2016). However, in Masip et al.’s study, novice offi cers in 
police-related situations made as many deception judgments as 
experienced offi cers, presumably because novice offi cers felt that 
in a professional situation they had to “behave like a ‘real’ offi cer” 
(i.e., had to display “prototypical” police behaviors). Besides, 
reasons other than past experience may lead offi cers to believe that 
they will be the targets of deception in police-related situations. 
This research also makes an additional contribution to ALIED. 
Street’s (2015) theory predicts that when a specifi c statement 
contains little or no information indicative of veracity, respondents 
will resort to using context-general information—such as the base-
rates of lying vs. truth telling in a specifi c kind of situation—as 
a basis for their veracity judgments. However, “the account does 
not make any claims as to how people select or integrate multiple 
diagnostic individuating cues” (Street, 2015, p. 340). The current 
fi ndings for police-relevant situations suggest that when two 
contradictory pieces of individuating information are available, 
context-general information can play a role such that respondents 
either (a) disregard the two contradictory cues altogether and make 
their veracity judgment based on the context-general information 
only, or (b) tend to select as a basis for their judgments the only 
one piece of individuating information that is consistent with the 
context-general information (this latter explanation is in line with 
Masip et al.’s, 2006; and Nahari’s, 2012, fi ndings). 
Importantly, please note that we are not suggesting that in 
police-related situations context-general information leads offi cers 
to make lie judgments only. Rather, we are suggesting that offi cers’ 
tendency to make lie judgments will be stronger than that of non-
offi cers—or, put another way, that the offi cers’ tendency to make 
truth judgments will be lower than that of non-offi cers. Certainly, 
in judging police-relevant vignettes in the current experiment 
both offi cers and non-offi cers were biased toward making truth 
judgments, but offi cers were signifi cantly less so than non-offi cers. 
Thus, these are relative rather than absolute response tendencies.
Our prediction that experienced offi cers would show more 
judgmental confi dence than novice offi cers and non-offi cers 
irrespective of vignette kind was not supported. Instead, both 
police groups were more confi dent than the non-offi cers. This 
fi nding could be a result of offi cers having greater experience with 
deception than non-offi cers. However, the novice offi cers had little 
job experience; therefore, they could not have accumulated much 
experience with deception. We speculate that the small number 
of available cues may account for novice offi cers’ increased 
confi dence in the current study. In Masip et al.’s (2016) research, 
novice offi cers watched videotaped statements. The senders 
displayed many verbal, visual, and paralinguistic cues. Novice 
offi cers may have felt overwhelmed because of the large amount 
of information they had to pay attention to and process. Further, 
they may have felt uncertain as to whether they attended to the 
right cues, whether they missed something important, etc. (see 
Street & Richardson, 2015). Conversely, in the current study only 
two straightforward cues were available. This may have boosted 
novice offi cers’ confi dence ratings.
The current study has several limitations. First, critics may 
argue that the stimulus materials were too artifi cial and had little 
ecological validity. However, rather than exploring the police 
response bias in naturalistic contexts, our goal was to test whether 
the fi ndings obtained using more realistic paradigms would still 
emerge in a contrived situation where cue availability was severely 
restricted. In this respect, the artifi ciality of the materials was not a 
limitation but an asset (see Hensel, 1980; Mook, 1983). 
Second, we strived to use two sets of vignettes (police relevant 
and police irrelevant) as ambiguous as possible in terms of veracity. 
However, although the vignettes were selected in the pilot study 
such that each set had roughly a 50% baseline of lie judgments 
(determined with non-offi cer control participants), in the main 
experiment the protagonists in police-relevant vignettes looked 
particularly believable. This circumstance, tough undesirable, 
could not have affected the results because all three groups rated 
exactly the same police-relevant vignettes (i.e., it is not the case 
that one group rated particularly believable vignettes while another 
group rated particularly unbelievable ones). Finally, the observed 
effects were not large; therefore, replication is warranted before 
deriving strong conclusions from the current fi ndings. 
Conclusions
To summarize, in judging police-relevant vignettes, offi cers 
made more lie judgments than non-offi cers. No group difference 
emerged in judging police-irrelevant vignettes. Thus, apparently 
offi cers are less truth biased only in police-relevant contexts. 
These fi ndings are consistent with Street’s (2015) Adaptive Lie 
Detector Theory. All offi cers (not only the experienced ones) 
displayed more confi dence than non-offi cers. Some of the current 
fi ndings differ from previous ones; however, the contrived nature 
of the experimental setting may have infl uenced the results. 
Future research should continue to explore how police relevance 
infl uences experienced and novice offi cers’ veracity judgments.
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